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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we explore the connection between labor market segmentation 
in two sectors, a modern protected formal sector and a traditional- 
unprotected-informal sector, and overeducation in a developing country. 
Informality is thought to have negative consequences, primarily through 
poorer working conditions, lack of social security, as well as low levels of 
productivity throughout the economy. This paper considers an aspect that has 
not been previously addressed, namely the fact that informality might also 
affect the way workers match their actual education with that required 
performing their job. We use micro-data from Colombia to test the 
relationship between overeducation and informality. Empirical results 
suggest that, once the endogeneity of employment choice has been accounted 
for, formal male workers are less likely to be overeducated. Interestingly, the 
propensity of being overeducated among women does not seem to be closely 
related to the sector choice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A main feature of almost all developing countries is the presence of a large proportion of workers 
employed in the unregulated-unprotected-informal sector.1 According to the dualistic view, based 
on the Harris and Todaro (1970) model, jobs are rationed in the formal sector due to labor market 
rigidities of an institutional nature, such as labor unions and minimum wages legislation. As a 
result some workers are forced to accept informal sector jobs characterized by precarious 
working conditions, lack of social security and inferior earnings. Most studies of labor markets in 
developing countries find that some characteristics are better rewarded in formal jobs (e.g., 
Pradhan and Van Soest 1995; Tansel 2000; Gong and Van Soest 2002; Botelho and Ponczek 
2011). However it is possible that rigidities associated with formal jobs might also affect the way 
workers match their actual education with the one required to perform their job. In a segmented 
labor market of such characteristics, as long as the more highly educated workers tend to be 
more productive than their less skilled counterparts, education may not provide access to good 
jobs. A highly skilled worker who is unable to obtain a high-skill job in the formal sector may 
accept a low-skill job in the informal sector for which she is overeducated. An individual worker is 
said to be overeducated if she has acquired more education than what is required to perform her 
job. Overeducation is, thus, often taken to imply that resources are not efficiently used, since 
overeducated workers make lower returns on their investment relative to similarly educated 
individuals whose jobs match appropriately their level of education. Here, we assume that 
overeducation in a developing country is not independent of market segmentation into formal and 
informal sector. 
There is now a substantial body of literature addressing the phenomenon of 
overeducation in developed countries.2 An increasing amount of this literature is concerned with 
                                                 
1 Throughout this article, as in Botelho and Ponczek (2011), the informal sector term is related to the nature 
of the job and not of the firm in which the workers is employed. This is so because our data relates only to 
workers and not to firms. The definition of an informal job that will be used in this article is that of a job that 
does not pays contributions to the social security system. 
2Duncan and Hoffman (1981), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), Sicherman (1991), Tsang, Rumberger and 
Levin (1991), McGoldrick and Robst (1996) studied the phenomenon for the United States; Alpin, 
Shackleton and Walsh (1998), Green, McIntosh and Vignoles (2002), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and 
Chevalier (2003) for the UK; Hartog and Oosterbeek (1998) and Groot and Massen van den Brink (2000) 
for Holland; Bauer (2002) and Buchel and van Ham (2003) for Germany; Kiker, Santos and De Oliveira 
(1997) and Mendes de Oliveira, Santos and Kiker (2000) for Portugal; Alba-Ramirez (1993) for Spain. For 
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providing an explanation for overeducation that is consistent with one of the theoretical 
frameworks of the labor market: human capital theory (Becker 1964), the job competition model 
(Thurow 1975) or the assignment models (Tinbergen 1956). The majority of studies tend to 
support the assignment interpretation, arguing that earnings depend to some extent on both 
individual and job characteristics. These models also imply that there is no reason to expect 
wage rates to be correlated only to acquired schooling or other individual attributes (human 
capital theory), nor should it be expected that individual productivity and, hence, earnings will be 
determined solely by job characteristics (job competition model). In addition, a number of studies 
have also estimated the effects of overeducation on earnings. These studies show that 
overeducated workers tend to earn higher returns to their years of schooling than co-workers who 
are not overeducated, but lower returns than workers with a similar level of education who are 
employed in jobs that require the same level of education that they possess.  
To the best of our knowledge, few studies have examined overeducation in developing 
countries. Quinn and Rubb (2006) study the phenomenon for Mexico, Abbas (2008) for Pakistan 
and Mehta et al. (2011) for India, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand. One reason for this 
paucity of studies might be data limitations that hinder identification of the education levels 
required for specific jobs. Moreover, despite the increase in recent decades in average schooling 
attainment in developing countries, the average presented in these economies is lower than that 
presented in high-income countries. In Latin American and Caribbean Countries the average 
educational attainment for females and males between the ages of 21 and 24 are 9.6 and 9.3 
years, respectively (Duryea et al. 2007). By comparison, the average for the OECD countries is 
12.5 for males and 12.8 for females aged between 25 and 34 (OECD Education at a Glance 
2010). The fact that educational attainment remains low in developing countries means that the 
overeducation is a somewhat contradictory phenomenon for these economies. Nevertheless, 
previous studies find evidence of overeducation in developing countries (Quinn and Rubb 2006 
for Mexico; Abbas 2008 for Pakistan and Mehta et al. 2011 for unskilled jobs in the Philippines) 
and report that the incidence of overeducation is similar to that present in developed economies.  
Given the differences between the labor markets of developed and developing 
economies, it is plausible that the factors accounting for overeducation may differ. As has already 
been mentioned labors markets of developing economies are characterized by a high degree of 
informality. In the specific case of Latin America, the informal sector employs between 30 and 
                                                                                                                                                               
an extensive review of overeducation in developed countries see McGuinness (2006) and for a recent 
survey on overeducation see Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011). 
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70% of the urban work force (Maloney 2004), embracing a variety of heterogeneous activities, 
such as self-employed entrepreneurs, salaried workers employed in large and small firms, and 
unpaid domestic workers. Besides the well-known negative implications of informality, primarily 
the result of poorer working conditions, a segmented labor market (divided between a formal and 
an informal jobs) might also affect the way workers match their acquired education with the 
education required to perform their job. As Berry and Sabot (1978) affirm, “one of the 
inefficiencies associated with segmentation, more difficult to document but possibly imposing 
greater resource costs on the economies of developing countries, involves the failure of the 
market to move the ‘right’ resources into high wage sectors, a failure commonly described by the 
term ‘mismatch’”. Building on this statement, here we assume that the study of overeducation in a 
developing economy with a large informal sector cannot fail to examine the role played by this 
segmentation.  
Our assumption also builds on a model developed by Charlot and Decreuse (2005). This 
model shows that self-selection in education is inefficient in presence of labor market 
segmentation. As workers do not internalize the impact of their education decision on the others 
wage and employment perspectives, too many workers are willing to acquire education and this 
leads to overeducation. In our opinion, this is a reasonable explanation for educational mismatch 
in the labor markets of developing countries that presents labor market segmentation into a 
formal and an informal sector. In contrast with (some) developed countries in which 
overeducation is clearly associated with large endowments of education, the population in 
developing economies presents low or moderate levels of education attainment. Formal and 
informal labor market segmentation is, thus, a phenomenon that could account for overeducation 
in these economies. However, this model it is not able to predict in which sector the incidence of 
overeducation will be highest; in this regard our empirical exercise tries to shed light on this issue. 
Colombia is a good example of a developing country characterized by the high degree of 
informality in its labor market, and the country’s informal employment makes an interesting case 
to study for several reasons. First, informality today is at the center of economic debate in the 
country because of the high levels that prevail. Second, in Colombia there is a high incidence of 
the minimum wage, i.e. a relatively high proportion of formal sector employees receive a salary 
similar to the minimum, which points to the existence of important labor market rigidities. Third, 
previous studies have found overeducation to exist in Colombia (Mora 2005, Castillo 2007, 
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Dominguez Moreno 20093). Finally, studies of informality in Colombia and other developing 
countries focus primarily on the size of the informal sector, on the likelihood that workers 
enter/exit the informal sector and on the formal/informal sector wage differentials.4 However, little 
attention has been paid to the effects of a large informal sector on the way workers match their 
education with the one required to perform their job. If labor market segmentation can lead to 
education-occupation mismatches, then it may also affect the allocation of resources in the 
educational system, one manifestation of which is the bias toward academic training (Berry and 
Sabot 1978).  
Summing up, in this paper we study the contribution of working in a formal or an informal 
job on the probability of being overeducated in a developing country with low or moderate 
educational attainment. We hypothesize that in developing countries with a large informal sector, 
educated workers that do not find a high skilled formal job may accept an unskilled informal job 
for which she is overeducated, i.e. informal workers are more likely to be overeducated than 
formal workers. We test the positive relationship between informality and overeducation by 
exploiting information in a micro-data set for Colombian workers. In so doing, two types of 
empirical models are used: firstly, a simple univariate probit model that assumes that the 
unobservable characteristics that affect an individual’s chances of working in either formal or 
informal jobs are independent of those determining her propensity to be overeducated; and, 
secondly, a bivariate probit model that enables us to control for the likely endogeneity of the 
selection of the formal or informal job. Our results confirm that, conditional on other individual and 
family characteristics, formal workers present a significantly lower probability of being 
overeducated. This general result seems to be driven by the fact that male informal workers face 
                                                 
3 Using micro-data for Colombia, Dominguez Moreno (2009) studies the probability of working in the formal 
sector, including as an explanatory variable whether the worker is overeducated or not. In our view, this 
direction of the causal relationship between informality and overeducation is not correct. As a matter of fact, 
educational mismatch is observed after the match has happened and it is not a worker's intrinsic condition. 
If that were the case, studies analyzing the determinants of the probability of employment should include 
over-education in the list of explanatory variable. As far as we know this has not been the practice so far. 
On the top of that, Dominguez Moreno (2009) did not consider the likely endogeneity of overeducation 
caused by the effect of omitted unobserved factors influencing both informality and overeducation. 
4 See, e.g., Magnac (1991), Nuñez (2002), Maloney and Nuñez (2004), Floréz (2002), Kugler and Kugler 
(2009) and Mondragón-Vélez, Peña and Wills (2010) for Colombia; Gindling (1991) for Costa Rica; 
Pradhan and van Soest (1995) for Bolivia; Amuedo-Dorantes (2004) for Chile; Pratap and Quintin (2006) 
for Argentina Günther; Tansel (2000) for Turkey; Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruff (1997) and 
Gong and Van Soest (2002) for Mexico; Pisani and Pagán (2004) for Nicaragua; Botelho and Ponczek 
(2011) for Brazil; Badaoui, Strobl and Walsh (2008) for South Africa. 
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a greater probability of being overeducated, whereas no significant differences are detected 
between informal and formal female workers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section gives the details concerning the data 
and presents some selected descriptors, while the empirical approach is presented in section 3. 
Section 4 summarizes the estimate results of the empirical models, section 5 presents some 
robustness checks and, finally, section 6 contains the conclusions 
 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We use data from the 2008 wave of the Colombian Household Survey (CHS), a repeated cross-
section conducted by the National Statistics Department (DANE). This survey gathers information 
about employment conditions for a population aged 12 years or more and includes data about 
income, occupation, industry, and firm size, in addition to the individual’s general characteristics 
of sex, age, marital status and educational attainment. Certain household characteristics, such as 
the head of the household, the number of children, and the level of education of all its members, 
are also included. The CHS covers the thirteen major metropolitan areas of Colombia, which in 
2008 accounted for 45% of the country’s population. It should be noted that this survey has been 
used for various empirical studies analyzing labor market issues in Colombia (see, for example, 
Magnac 1991; Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005). 
The analysis conducted herein was limited to employed individuals between the ages of 15 
and 60 that were not undertaking formal studies and who reported working more than 16 hours 
per week. Government employees, household employees, the self-employed, bosses or 
employers, unpaid family workers, workers without pay in enterprises or other family businesses 
were not included in the sample. The subsequent sample used in the analysis comprised 15,104 
observations. 
As a starting point in our analysis, we had to use a criterion to determine whether a worker 
in the sample is overeducated, and if that worker is employed in the formal or informal sector. 
Four basic methods have been suggested in the literature for measuring the education required 
for a job and, consequently, for determining overeducation. The first ‘subjective’ approach uses 
self-assessment to define the job’s educational requirements and then compares this with the 
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worker’s actual education (Battu, Belfield and Sloane 2000; McGuinness 2003). The second is a 
variation on the above and involves asking the worker directly whether he or she is overeducated 
(Devillanova 2012). Overeducation can also be calculated objectively by using job analysts 
definitions of the educational requirement for each occupation, as available in the United States 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and comparing this with the workers educational level 
(Rumberger 1987; Hartog and Oosterbeek 1988; Kiker, Santos and Mendes de Oliveira 1997; 
Chevalier 2003). An alternative objective measure is obtained by analyzing the distribution of 
education in each occupation; employees who depart from the mean (Verdugo and Verdugo 
1989) or mode (Mendes de Oliveira, Santos and Kiker 2000) by more than one standard 
deviation are classified as being overeducated. This last approach is usually known as the 
‘statistical’ method.   
Since the CHS does not supply information to construct a subjective measure of 
overeducation, and taking into account that the requirements of education in the rather broad 
categories of occupations (two-digit ISCO classification) available in the CHS are likely to differ 
from those in the US economy, we decided to follow other studies in the literature in applying the 
‘statistical’ approach based on the mean of the distribution of education within each two-digit 
occupation.5 By using such an objective measure, the overall incidence of overeducation in the 
sample was found to be 15%, a figure similar to that reported for other developing economies 
(Quinn and Rubb 2006) and lower than the incidence of overeducation in developed economies 
(McGuinness 2006).  
As regards informality, alternative definitions and corresponding ways of measuring it have 
been proposed in the literature. This lack of consensus largely reflects issues of data availability 
in each study. In the particular case of Colombia, according to DANE, informal workers are those 
who fall into at least one of these categories: (i) work in firms with five or fewer employees; (ii) are 
unpaid family workers and housekeepers; (iii) are self employed who work in places of up to five 
persons other than independent professionals and technicians; or (iv) are business owners of 
firms with five or less employees. This definition, in line with that proposed by the International 
Labor Office, has been criticized in the literature because it does not take into account the 
benefits associated with formal employment, such as inclusion in the social security system 
                                                 
5 As stressed in Ramos and Sanromà (2011), a two-digit classification of occupations is not optimal for 
applying the mode criterion. In addition, Mehta et al. (2011) emphasized that the modal education is more 
prone to shift even when technology and the jobs-pool do not.  In any case, we also computed the results 
of the following sections using the mode criterion, and the main conclusions remained the same as those 
derived from results using the mean criteria (results are available upon request). 
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(Flórez 2000). Nevertheless, the data made available by the CHS allow us to determine whether 
the workers in the sample are covered or not by the social security system, and it even 
distinguishes between contributions to the retirement pension and to the health system. Using 
this information, we classified workers as formally or informally employed according to their 
degree of inclusion in the social security system. That is to say, an individual was classified as a 
formal worker if she contributed to both health and retirement pension systems. Applying this 
condition, as many as 33.3% of individuals in the entire sample worked in informal jobs.6  
The incidence of overeducation in the entire sample and in the two sectors and the 
percentage of Colombian workers in the formal and in the informal sector are shown in the first 
set of rows in Table 1. This table also displays basic summary statistics concerning the 
distribution of the individual and job characteristics considered in the subsequent analysis, 
distinguishing in this regard between workers in the formal and informal jobs. In addition, to 
obtain some insights into differences by gender in the magnitudes under analysis, figures were 
computed for the entire sample and for men and women separately.  
As mentioned above, 15% of Colombian urban workers were overeducated, this figure 
being higher in the case of formal workers (17%) than for those employed in informal jobs (11%). 
This gap of six percentage points is found for both male and female workers. As for the 
distribution of workers in each sector, around one third had an informal job in 2008, this 
percentage being higher for men (35%) than for women (31%). Differences in overeducation 
between the two sectors and by gender might simply be caused by disparities in the distribution 
of the characteristics that are assumed to affect the incidence of overeducation. Actually, the 
comparison of the figures reported in Table 1 confirms that there are substantial differences in 
some of the observable worker and job characteristics of formal and informal workers. As a 
matter of example, the number of years of schooling, as a measure of education, are not only 
useful as a proxy for general human capital but they are also likely to be correlated with 
unobserved individual ability. What the figures show is that informal workers are more likely to 
have education levels below those of formal workers: whereas 45% of informal workers in the 
entire sample have at most basic secondary education, the percentage of workers in formal jobs 
with secondary or tertiary education is as high as 81% (45% with tertiary education). If, as 
expected, there is a strong association between education and the likelihood of overeducation, 
                                                 
6 Self-employment in Latin America generally constitutes one of the principle sources of employment and a 
large proportion of the self-employed operate in the informal sector. If the sample is not restricted to 
exclude self-employees, the percentage of informal workers increases up to 59% for 2008. 
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such a gap in educational attainment could explain much of the difference observed in the 
overeducation figures between the two sectors. 
 
There are significant differences in other characteristics as well. The percentage of female 
workers in formal jobs is higher than that in informal, perhaps due to the fact that our sample 
excludes self-employed individuals. A much larger proportion of the workforce in formal jobs is 
married, and workers in those jobs tend to accumulate much more tenure than informal workers, 
suggesting a higher stability of employment for formal workers. As for the occupational structure, 
the share of informal workers in unskilled occupations (42%), and the share in merchant, vendor 
and service jobs (36%) is larger than that in the formal sector, while administrative staff (24%) 
and professionals and technicians are more strongly represented in formal jobs. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that more than two thirds of informal workers are employed in small firms, with 
10 or less workers. This is in sharp contrast with figures of formal jobs, where more than half 
formal workers work in firms with more than 100 employees, and around two thirds in firms with 
at least 50 employees. In short, these figures indicate a close connection between informality and 
firm size in Colombia. 
As for the gender component, Table 1 shows that male and female workers differ in some 
of the characteristics that are supposed to affect overeducation. Interestingly, the most 
remarkable differences affect the distribution of education levels and occupations. Broadly 
speaking, female workers are more highly educated than their male counterparts, and find 
themselves concentrated in occupations such as administrative staff (24%), merchant and vendor 
jobs (22%) and service work (20%), while men are more highly concentrated in unskilled 
occupations (48%), which are associated with higher levels of informality. 
This simple descriptive analysis suggests i) the presence of quite large levels of 
overeducation in Colombia, ii) apparently, affecting more intensively formal workers than informal 
workers, and iii) that formal and informal workers differ in their levels of educational attainment, 
occupational distribution, and other individual and job characteristics, which are thought to exert 
an influence on the individual’s probability of being overeducated. Since the greater incidence of 
overeducation in formal jobs might well be caused by a composition effect (for example, 
associated with the higher education of workers in that jobs), in the section that follows we 
estimate the impact of informality on overeducation but in relation to the conditioning factors of 
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observable worker and job characteristics. 
 
 
3. Informality and overeducation. Empirical specification 
 
A multivariate empirical model needs to be specified in order to assess the impact of formal or 
informal sector on the probability of Colombian workers being overeducated, conditional on other 
observed individual, household and job characteristics. In so doing, we first assume that the 
allocation of a worker to a formal or informal sector is exogenous to her chances of being 
overeducated. Under such an assumption, a univariate probabilistic specification provides 
consistent estimates of the effect of the sector on the chances of the worker having more 
education than that required for her occupation. However, the endogeneity assumption can easily 
be questioned. Were this to be the case, the standard probabilistic specification with exogenous 
covariates would lack consistency. To address this issue, we estimate the effect of the sector by 
means of a bivariate specification in which this variable is instrumented. 
Briefly, a simple way to identify the determinants of educational mismatch is to assume a 
latent continuous (unobserved) variable  for the probability of overeducation of worker i, which 
is related to a linear index function and an additive error term, : 
          (1) 
 
where  is a vector of individual and firm characteristics (including age, gender, marital 
status, head of household, education, tenure, occupation, industry sector, contract type and the 
unemployment rate of the metropolitan area),  is a dummy variable for the sector (formal or 
informal), and  is a normally distributed error with zero mean and unit variance. 
The observed dichotomous realization  of the latent variable  is as follows: 
 if the individual is overeducated   
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 otherwise 
 
Given the normality of the error term in (1) a probit specification can be used to estimate 
the effect of the sector on the probability of being overeducated, conditional on the other 
characteristics in X: 
     (2) 
where  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
Since the estimate of the coefficient α is only informative about the sign of the impact of S, 
its associated marginal effect is computed from the estimates of the probit model in (2) as: 
       (3) 
where the bar over the X denotes the sample average. 
As indicated above, the assumption made in the specification of the univariate probit in (2) 
is that the sector (formal or informal) is exogenous to the probability of being overeducated. 
However, if the assignment of workers to each of the sectors is not random and some 
unobservable factors (ability among others) that influence the probability of being assigned to a 
particular sector are also affecting the probability of being overeducated, then the estimation of a 
univariate probit would suffer from selection bias.7 This would have dramatic consequences on 
the inference since the estimates from the univariate probit would be inconsistent if this 
endogeneity was ignored. 
To take account of this potential drawback properly, in a second step, we estimate the 
effect of the sector in a bivariate probit model, in which the sector is instrumented by family 
characteristics. In addition to the latent outcome equation in (1), the bivariate model is based on 
an additional equation for the latent model linking the probability of assignment to the formal or 
informal sector to a set of characteristics: 
                                                 
7 We have ignored another type of selection whereby an individual might not accept a job that does not 
match his or her level of education and chooses instead to be unemployed or to remain outside the labor 
force. We argue that this selection bias is irrelevant in the case of Colombia where there is no 
unemployment benefit system and the family protection network against unemployment is low or exclusive 
to a group of high-income individuals.  
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           (4) 
 
where Zi is a vector of observed individual and family characteristics, and i is a normally 
distributed error term. Zi includes the set of characteristics in Xi plus some additional variables 
used as instruments for the assignment to the sector, . 
Since we can only observe the sector for each individual, the link between the observed 
binary variable  and the latent variable  is assumed to be as follows: 
 if the individual is overeducated   
 otherwise 
Therefore, the probit specification associated with the probability of working in a formal 
job, conditioned to the characteristics in Z, stands as: 
       (5) 
The bivariate probit thus consists of equations (2) and (5), where i and i are distributed bivariate 
normal, with E[i] =  E[i] = 0, var[i] = var[i] = 1 and cov[i,i] = . In other words, the empirical 
model allows for the likely correlation of the unobserved determinants of overeducation and the 
unobserved determinants of the sector. In such a framework, there are four possible states of the 
world (Yi = 0 or 1 and Si = 0 or 1), and the corresponding log-likelihood function associated to this 
set of events is (for further details see Wooldridge 2002, p.478): 
+ 
  (6) 
 
The inference in the bivariate probit model is based on the maximization of the log-
likelihood in eq. (6) with respect to the parameters , ,  and . If  is statistically different from 
0, the endogeneity of the assignment to the formal or the informal sector would be confirmed, and 
thus estimates from the bivariate probit are preferable; otherwise conclusions regarding the 
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impact of the sector could be based on the estimate of the univariate probit in eq. (2).8 As in the 
case of the univariate probit model, marginal effects are computed from the estimates of the 
bivariate probit model to assess the contribution of each variable to the probability of being 
overeducated.  
Two issues that usually result from the estimation of a bivariate probit model with an 
endogenous binary regressor are identification and the selection of valid instruments. 
Identification can be achieved by relying solely on the functional form and the distributional 
assumptions. However, the objective of forming a consistent estimator for  becomes 
manageable if we can construct at least one instrument for Si . A variable Ii would be a valid 
instrument for Si if it were a determinant of the sector of employment and it were not correlated 
with the error term of the overeducation equation (outcome equation). The first condition is easy 
to check; we can verify whether Zi  is correlated with Si , once the other variables have been 
controlled for. However, it is harder to test if the instrument is valid or not. In the context of the 
bivariate probit model, this condition relies on the economic or institutional knowledge related to 
the problem under study. 
As in many other studies, finding suitable instrumental variables is far from 
straightforward, since almost any regressor that determines the probability of being overeducated 
could plausibly affect assignment into formal and informal jobs as well. Previews studies about 
informality control for household characteristics, that may affect a person’s propensity to be 
employed in the informal sector, such as the number of children in a household, number of 
inactive adults in a household, and earnings of other household members (Hill 1983; Magnac 
1991, Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruff 1997; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003; Pisani and 
Pagán 2004; Maloney 2004). To the best of our knowledge, in the over-education literature only 
Mavromaras and McGuinness (2012) use the presence of children as a control variable in probit 
estimations of overskilling, situation where a worker reports that their skills are not fully utilized in 
their job. The authors only report a marginal statistical significance for the coefficient of this 
variable, and only for the group of moderately overskilled workers. Thus, it could be the case that 
certain family characteristics influence an individual’s choice regarding formal or informal 
employment but do not affect overeducation, such as the presence of children in the household 
and the earnings of other household members. One reason why such family characteristics may 
                                                 
8 A bivariate probit model with an endogenous binary regressor has been used in, for instance, Evans and 
Schwab (1995) to analyze the effect of catholic schools on finishing high school and starting college. 
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affect the sector of employment is because they are closely related to the households income 
needs. For instance, having more children means more expenses for the household and increase 
the need of finding a job, which is presumably more easily available in the informal sector. On the 
other side, informal sector is characterized by greater flexibility in the working hours, which aids 
combining working life with childcare. The assumption here is that the presence of children does 
not exert a significant effect on the propensity to be overeducated. Another family characteristic 
that is thought to influence the choice of employment sector but not the individual’s propensity to 
be overeducated is the social status, which we suggest is captured by the educational 
achievement of other members of the household. Accordingly, we construct the average number 
of years of schooling of other household members and use this as an additional instrument for 
the sector of employment.  
 
4. Informality and overeducation. Results 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients when running the univariate probit model 
are reported in Table 2 both for the entire sample and separately for male and female workers. 
The corresponding marginal effects for the average individual as defined in eq. (3) are also 
reported. Our results show that after controlling for other characteristics, formal workers are less 
likely to be overeducated than their informal counterparts. In other words, when we compare 
formal and informal workers with similar individual, household, and firm characteristics, those in 
the former group have a lower propensity to be overeducated. This contrasts sharply with the raw 
probabilities derived from the sample since, as the descriptive analysis in section 2 shows, the 
share of overeducated workers in the formal sector is greater than that in the informal sector. 
Thus, these results suggest that a sorting effect drives the gap in the raw propensities. 
Yet, it should be mentioned that the marginal effect associated with working in formal jobs 
is of a moderate magnitude. The probability that a formal worker is overeducated is just 2.5 
percentage points (pp) less than that for an otherwise similar informal worker. The impact on 
probability is even lower for men at 1.86 pp, and somewhat higher for women at 2.72 pp. 
Interestingly, the coefficient and the corresponding marginal effect are statistically significant only 
at the 5% confidence level in the separate samples for both genders. Thus, the results from the 
univariate probit model suggest a modest impact of formality on overeducation having first 
controlled for education and other observable characteristics.  
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In the case of the estimates of the coefficients for the control variables, the results shown 
in Table 2 are consistent with previous findings in the literature. For the sake of brevity, we only 
comment on the results for the whole sample. As expected, the probability of being overeducated 
increases with educational attainment (Alba-Ramirez 1993; Kiker, Santos and Mendes de 
Oliveira 1997 ; Quinn and Rubb 2006). Overeducated workers may substitute education for a lack 
of job experience, taking jobs that require less education than they actually possess in order to 
accumulate experience and improve their chances of finding a better job match (Rosen 1972; 
Sicherman and Galor 1990; Mendes de Oliveira, Santos and Kiker 2000). As such, we expect 
overeducated workers to have less job experience. To test this hypothesis we use a variable that 
measures experience, specifically potential experience calculated as an individual’s age minus 
five years of education. On the other hand, several studies report that overeducation may have a 
negative effect on job satisfaction (Tsang, Rumberger and Levin 1991), if this is the case, then 
overeducated workers with more tenure in a firm can be expected to be more prone to turnover. 
Consequently we hypothesize that overeducated workers will have less tenure. The results for 
the estimated marginal effect of general experience confirm the expected negative effect of this 
variable on the probability of an average worker in the sample being overeducated. However, it 
should be pointed out that this marginal effect is only significantly different from zero at a 10% 
confidence level. The impact of tenure is also negative, though almost negligible and, not in fact 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results for Colombia are in conflict with the evidence on the 
substitutability between education and other forms of human capital postulated by the human 
capital theory, according to which overeducation might be seen as a transitory situation. 
The results also indicate that females are less likely to be overeducated than males 
presenting similar characteristics, and that marital status does not have a statistically significant 
impact on the probability of being overeducated for both genders. Significant differences do exist 
however in terms of industry and firm size. Compared to individuals employed in Agriculture, 
mining, electricity, gas and water (our reference category), those employed in construction are 
more likely to be overeducated, while those working in transportation, financial intermediation and 
social services are less likely to be overeducated. As for firm size, the incidence of overeducation 
conditional on other characteristics is slightly lower for small (4 to 50 workers) and substantially 
lower for medium size firms (51 to 100 workers). Finally, it is worth mentioning that local labor 
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market conditions do not seem to be relevant, as the coefficient of the metropolitan 
unemployment rate, although positive, is not statistically significant. 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that the specification used to obtain these results 
assumes the exogeneity of the employment and the absence of a simultaneous impact of the 
unobservable characteristics on the probability of overeducation and on the assignment of formal 
or informal sector. The violation of these assumptions would invalidate the results. 
Our estimates of the effect of the sector, when relaxing the assumption of exogeneity and 
the lack of correlation between the unobservable variables that influence both overeducation and 
formality/informality, are summarized in Table 3. These results correspond to the maximum 
likelihood estimates obtained from the bivariate probit model described in section 3, using 
instruments for the employment sector and the same set of control variables as those employed 
in the univariate probit model. Here, the discussion focuses solely on the coefficients of the 
equation for the probability of being overeducated since the estimates obtained for the 
parameters in the formal/informal sector equation (see Table A1 in the appendix) are relatively 
standard, and largely conform to results reported elsewhere (Magnac 1991; Pradhan and van 
Soest 1995). Below, we first examine the entire sample of Colombian workers, and then discuss 
the differences that emerge between the samples of male and female workers. 
The coefficient of the formal sector and the corresponding marginal effect are estimated to 
be negative and highly significant. In fact, the magnitude of the marginal effect of working in the 
formal sector estimated from the bivariate probit model is substantially higher than that estimated 
by the univariate probit model. The results suggest that, for otherwise similar workers, working in 
the formal sector reduces the probability of overeducation by 16.44 pp. This finding confirms that 
selection bias strongly affects the estimate of the effect of the employment sector on the 
probability of being overeducated and, hence, the need to account for it. On the other hand, it 
seems that, in addition to the benefits associated with receiving social security and higher wages, 
being a formal worker also ensures a better use of one’s skills in the workplace. Or, alternatively, 
informal workers, in addition to receiving lower wages and no health and pension cover, are less 
likely to make proper use of their acquired knowledge in the workplace. As discussed in the 
introduction, to the best of our knowledge this finding has not previously been recorded, and 
represents a novel contribution of this study. 
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Note that the estimate of  (correlation between the error terms of the overeducation and 
the employment sector equations) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that non-
observable characteristics that exert a positive effect on the probability of being formal employed 
also have a positive impact on the probability of being overeducated. This could be interpreted as 
evidence that in the case of formal workers overeducation is caused, to some extent, by the 
desire to form part of the formal sector (better employment opportunities, social system 
protection, etc.). A worker with a certain level of education might take a job for which less 
education is actually required, simply because that job is protected, for example, by the minimum 
wage. 
An alternative interpretation of the positive effect of unobservable factors on the 
probability of being overeducated can be made from within an internal labor market framework 
(Doeringer and Piore 1972). Internal labor markets are those in which workers are hired into 
entry-level jobs, while higher levels are filled from within. Certain rules differentiate the members 
of the internal labor market from outsiders and accord them rights and privileges that would not 
otherwise be available. Typically these internal rights include certain guarantees of job security 
and opportunities for career mobility. If an internal labor market exists, then there must be some 
jobs, presumably at high levels, that are filled almost exclusively through internal promotion and 
there must be other port-of-entry jobs, presumably at low levels, that are filled through external 
hiring. In this context, individuals in any given firm are hired into its lower or middle levels and 
subsequently succeed in advancing to higher levels. Workers that do not have the qualifications 
for particular entry-level jobs are thus excluded from accessing the entire job ladder. For this 
reason, workers may initially accept a job for which their actual education is higher than that 
actually required in exchange for the benefits of gaining access to an internal labor market. It 
should be stressed that internal labor markets operate in the primary sector (formal) rather than in 
the secondary sector (informal).  
As for the estimate of the coefficients, and the associated marginal effects of the other 
observable characteristics in the overeducation equation, they are, in general, roughly identical to 
those estimated with the univariate probit, with the exception of firm size. The estimates from the 
bivariate probit model indicate that compared to individuals working for micro-firms (those with 
less than 10 workers), workers in small, medium and large firms are more likely to be 
overeducated. This result can be interpreted as follows: large firms usually have better job 
opportunities (as well as paying higher wages), and workers have better chances of being 
promoted and of receiving more on-the-job training. These characteristics mean that job offers 
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from large firms are valued highly by job seekers who might apply for vacancies in which the 
required level of education is less than the one they have acquired. Likewise, large firms in the 
formal sector are in a position to select the most highly skilled from the pool of available workers. 
Yet, it should be pointed out that the impact on overeducation is weaker in the case of medium 
size firms (between 50 and 100 workers), where the coefficient is not, in fact, statistically 
significant. 
Finally, we should stress that the results by gender point to a substantial difference in the 
impact of the sector on the probability of being overeducated. Whereas, for a male, having a 
formal job reduces the propensity of overeducation by 20.09 pp compared to a similar informal 
male worker, for females the effect is lower, 10.71 pp and its only statistical significance at the 
5% confidence level. Interestingly, for the female workers we do not find a significant correlation 
between the errors of the two equations in contrast with the highly significant correlation 
coefficient for males. 
 
5. Robustness checks. Validity of the instruments 
 
The estimates of the bivariate probit presented in Table 3 are consistent and unbiased as long as 
the instruments are correlated with the probability of working in formal or informal sector but not 
with the error term of the over-education equation in (2). In order to investigate if the selected 
instruments are valid we implement a procedure suggested by Cohen-Zadar and Elder (2009) 
and also implemented by Kim (2011). This approach is based on the idea that the instruments, 
presence of children and average years of education of the other members of the household, 
exert an effect on the probability of over-education only through the sector, if it is formal or 
informal, but not directly. If the instruments do not influence the probability of overeducation apart 
from its effect on the sector, it should have no effect in the overeducation in a subsample of 
workers for whom the probability of working in either informal or formal jobs is closely to zero.  
One can argue that public employees are a specific group of workers for whom the 
probability of working in informal jobs is approximately zero.9 Then, for this subsample of workers, 
the instruments should have no effect in the probability of being overeducated. Table 4 reports 
                                                 
9 As a matter of fact, only 3.9% of the public employees report that they don’t make contribution to the 
health and old insurance system in contrast with the 33% of workers from private firms. 
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the effects of the educational achievement of other members of the household and the presence 
of children estimated from a probit overeducation equation for public employees, conditioning on 
the other set of controls used for the estimates of the probit overeducation equation for private 
employees in Table 3. Results in Table 4, for the total sample and for women working in the 
public sector, confirm that the coefficients of the instruments are not statistically significant, which 
means that the instruments do not exert a direct effect on the probability of being overeducated. 
In the case of men the educational achievement of other members of the household is statistical 
significant only at 5% but its marginal effect is considerably low -0.0075. Although an insignificant 
estimate for the coefficient associated to this variable is not guarantee of exogeneity, it does 
provide some evidence that its use as an instrument is likely not to be problematic. 
Last as a sensitive analysis for the IV estimates, we estimate the effect of the sector of 
employment on the probability of being overeducated using different set of the instruments. This 
sensitive analysis is presented in Table 5. For simplicity, and for purposes of comparison, the 
estimates of Table 3 are presented in column [1]. The results of the biprobit when using only the 
average years of education of the other members of the household as an instrument are 
summarized in column [2], whereas those using only the presence of children as an instrument 
are shown in column [3]. As it can be seen the results reported in Table 5 shows that the 
estimated effect of the sector of employment on the probability of being overeducated is fairly 
robust to the set of instrument chosen. Still, in the entire sample and for males, the effect of the 
sector of employment is estimated to be lower when using as instruments only the dummies for 
the presence of children. In the sample of females, none of the two types of instruments provides 
with a significant estimate of the effect of the sector of employment. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has sought to add to the overeducation literature examining developing countries by 
analyzing the connection between labor market segmentation (the modern, protected, formal 
sector, on the one hand, and the traditional, unprotected, informal sector, on the other) and 
overeducation in Colombia. To date, studies concerned with informality in developing countries 
have focused primarily on the size of this sector, on the effects of labor market rigidities on 
employment, wages and their distribution, and on the probability of a worker entering the informal 
sector. However, no attention has been paid to the effects that a large informal sector has on the 
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way workers match their education with that required to perform their particular jobs. This study 
offers some new evidence in this respect.  
Using micro-data for Colombia, we have estimated two types of empirical models in order 
to test the relationship between overeducation and informality: a simple univariate probit model 
for the probability of being overeducated that includes the sector in which the individual is 
employed as an explanatory factor, formal or informal; and a bivariate probit model with an 
endogenous regressor that considers that the assignment of workers to each of the sector is not 
random and some unobservable factors which influence the probability of choosing a particular 
sector, could also affect the probability of being overeducated. The results of the univariate probit 
estimation indicate that formal workers are less likely to be overeducated than their informal 
counterparts. However, we have also shown that the assignment of workers to the formal or 
informal jobs is not random and that some unobservable characteristics that influence the 
probability of choosing a particular sector also affect the probability of being overeducated, 
particularly as regards male workers.  
 The results obtained from the bivariate probit model for the probability of overeducation, 
once the potential endogeneity of sector choice and overeducation were taken into account, 
confirm that formal workers are less likely to be overeducated and that non-observable 
characteristics that exert a positive effect on the probability of being a formal worker have a 
positive impact on the probability of being overeducated, in the case of male workers only. This 
could be interpreted as evidence that for formal male workers, overeducation is caused, at least 
in part, by a desire to have a formal job (better employment opportunities, social system 
protection, etc.). A worker with a good education may take a job for which less education is 
required, because that job is protected, for example, by the minimum wage.  
Although we are aware that our results have some shortcomings, including the standard 
criticism on the suitability of instruments, we believe that they are conclusive in terms of the 
correlations reported and in providing an initial understanding of the importance of the effect of 
labor market segmentation on the probability of being overeducated. According to our results it 
seems that, in addition to the benefits associated with receiving social security and earning higher 
wages, being a formal worker also ensures a better use of acquired skills in the workplace. To the 
best of our knowledge, no study has presented evidence of this to date. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the analysis 
 
  Total Sample   Men   Women 
Variable Total Informal Formal   Total Informal Formal   Total Informal Formal
Overeducation 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.17 
Informal 0.33 - - 0.35 - - 0.31 - - 
Age (years) 33.93 32.38 34.69 34.09 32.19 35.11 33.71 32.67 34.17 
Experience (years) 17.97 18.23 17.85 18.77 18.64 18.84 16.91 17.60 16.60 
Tenure (months) 48.56 27.51 59.00 48.69 27.92 59.84 48.39 26.90 57.94 
Women 0.43 0.40 0.44 - - - - - - 
Married 0.53 0.48 0.55 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.41 0.39 0.42 
Household Head 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.21 0.23 0.21 
Educational Attainment 
Basic Primary or below 0.13 0.23 0.08 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.05 
Basic secondary 0.14 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.07 
Secondary 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.32 
Higher education or more 0.36 0.18 0.45 0.28 0.13 0.37 0.46 0.26 0.56 
Education (years) 10.96 9.16 11.85 10.32 8.55 11.27 11.80 10.07 12.57 
Occupation 
Unskilled 0.33 0.42 0.28 0.48 0.60 0.41 0.13 0.15 0.12 
Professionals and Technicians 1 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 
Professionals and Technicians 2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Managers and Public Officials 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Administrative Staff 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.33 
Merchant and Vendor 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.21 
Service Worker 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.15 
Firm size 
Micro (1 -10 workers) 0.32 0.68 0.15 0.33 0.68 0.14 0.31 0.67 0.16 
Small (11 - 50 workers) 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.23 
Medium (51 - 100 workers) 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Large (101 workers or more) 0.39 0.11 0.53 0.38 0.10 0.53 0.40 0.13 0.53 
Sector 
Mining, electricity, gas and 
water 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Industry 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Construction 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.44 0.26 
Transportation 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Financial Intermediation 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.15 
Social Services 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.21 0.29 
Observations 15104 5006 10098 8629 3013 5616 6475 1993 4482 
Note. Figures are in percentages, excepting Age, Experience, Tenure and Education whose units of measurement are 
indicated in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 Research Institute of Applied Economics                                              Working Paper 2013/05, pàg.28 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group       Working Paper 2013/03, pag. 28 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 2. Estimates from the univariate probit over-education model 
  Total  Men  Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Formal -0.1498** -0.0250**  -0.1321* -0.0186*  -0.1457* -0.0272* 
 [0.0384] [0.0065]  [0.0518] [0.0073]  [0.0579] [0.0109] 
Schooling years 0.2409** 0.0401**  0.2700** 0.0381**  0.2166** 0.0404** 
 [0.0056] [0.0012]  [0.0078] [0.0017]  [0.0087] [0.0018] 
Experience (years) 0.0096+ -0.0006+  -0.001 -0.0015  0.0190* 0.0011* 
 [0.0056] [0.0003]  [0.0081] [0.0004]  [0.0082] [0.0005] 
Experience2 -0.0004* -  -0.0002 -  -0.0004+ - 
 [0.0001] -  [0.0002] -  [0.0002] - 
Tenure (months) -0.0006 -0.0001  -0.0003 0  -0.0009 -0.0002 
 [0.0006] [0.0001]  [0.0008] [0.0001]  [0.0009] [0.0001] 
Tenure2 0 -  0 -  0 - 
 [0.0000] -  [0.0000] -  [0.0000] - 
Women -0.2398** -0.0400**  - -  - - 
 [0.0419] [0.0070]  - -  - - 
Married -0.0232 -0.0039  0.0111 0.0016  -0.0505 -0.0094 
 [0.0493] [0.0082]  [0.0524] [0.0074]  [0.0458] [0.0086] 
Women Married -0.001 -0.0002  - -  - - 
 [0.0661] [0.0110]  - -  - - 
Household head -0.049 -0.0082  -0.0283 -0.004  0.0744 0.0139 
 [0.0493] [0.0082]  [0.0525] [0.0074]  [0.0532] [0.0099] 
Women Household head 0.1782* 0.0297*  - -  - - 
 [0.0712] [0.0119]  - -  - - 
Industry 0.0737 0.0123  0.1432 0.0202  -0.04 -0.0075 
 [0.0845] [0.0141]  [0.1068] [0.0150]  [0.1507] [0.0281] 
Construction 0.5034** 0.0839**  0.6339** 0.0894**  -0.1767 -0.033 
 [0.0983] [0.0164]  [0.1207] [0.0171]  [0.2187] [0.0408] 
Sales, Hotels, Restaurants -0.1029 -0.0171  -0.1376 -0.0194  -0.0354 -0.0066 
 [0.0848] [0.0142]  [0.1082] [0.0153]  [0.1490] [0.0278] 
Transportation -0.3531** -0.0588**  -0.4494** -0.0634**  -0.1926 -0.0359 
 [0.0928] [0.0156]  [0.1207] [0.0173]  [0.1590] [0.0297] 
Financial Intermediation -0.4160** -0.0693**  -0.5263** -0.0742**  -0.2867+ -0.0535+ 
 [0.0895] [0.0150]  [0.1167] [0.0167]  [0.1533] [0.0286] 
Social Services -0.4907** -0.0818**  -0.7589** -0.1070**  -0.3402* -0.0635* 
 [0.0879] [0.0147]  [0.1214] [0.0173]  [0.1487] [0.0277] 
Firm Size Small -0.0271 -0.0045  -0.0945 -0.0133  0.0594 0.0111 
 [0.0428] [0.0071]  [0.0584] [0.0082]  [0.0640] [0.0120] 
Firm Size Medium -0.2150** -0.0358**  -0.2305* -0.0325*  -0.1645 -0.0307 
 [0.0662] [0.0110]  [0.0896] [0.0126]  [0.1012] [0.0189] 
Firm Size Large 0.0022 0.0004  -0.1092+ -0.0154+  0.1421* 0.0265* 
 [0.0414] [0.0069]  [0.0573] [0.0081]  [0.0609] [0.0114] 
Metropolitan Area 
Unemployment Rate 0.0054 0.0009  0.0049 0.0007  0.0082 0.0015 
 [0.0078] [0.0013]  [0.0108] [0.0015]  [0.0114] [0.0021] 
Constant -3.6861** -  -3.9013** -  -3.8544** - 
 [0.1484] -  [0.2000] -  [0.2373] - 
Observations 15675   8890   6785  
Log pseudolikelihood  -5242.92   -2800.57   -2384.24  
Note. Robust standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Estimates from the bivariate probit model for the over-education equation  
  Total Men Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Formal -0.9075** -0.1644** -1.1884** -0.2009** -0.5617* -0.1071* 
 [0.1760] [0.0380] [0.2030] [0.0468] [0.2242] [0.0459] 
Schooling years 0.2509** 0.0454** 0.2750** 0.0465** 0.2250** 0.0429** 
 [0.0056] [0.0021] [0.0080] [0.0030] [0.0094] [0.0026] 
Experience (years) 0.0122* -0.0002* 0.0079 -0.0009 0.0171* 0.0011* 
 [0.0056] [0.0003] [0.0078] [0.0004] [0.0083] [0.0006] 
Experience2 -0.0004** - -0.0004+ - -0.0003 - 
 [0.0001] - [0.0002] - [0.0002] - 
Tenure (months) 0.0007 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 0 
 [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0008] [0.0001] [0.0011] [0.0001] 
Tenure2 0.0000 - 0 - 0 - 
 [0.0000] - [0.0000] - [0.0000] - 
Women -0.2013** -0.0365** - - - - 
 [0.0421] [0.0075] - - - - 
Married 0.0278 0.005 0.0647 0.0109 -0.0566 -0.0108 
 [0.0525] [0.0095] [0.0541] [0.0092] [0.0462] [0.0089] 
Women Married -0.0614 -0.0111 - - - - 
 [0.0682] [0.0124] - - - - 
Household head -0.0661 -0.012 -0.0466 -0.0079 0.0792 0.0151 
 [0.0520] [0.0094] [0.0537] [0.0091] [0.0586] [0.0111] 
Women Household head 0.1967* 0.0356* - - - - 
 [0.0765] [0.0137] - - - - 
Industry 0.0362 0.0066 0.0902 0.0153 -0.0577 -0.011 
 [0.0847] [0.0153] [0.1046] [0.0176] [0.1511] [0.0289] 
Construction 0.3834** 0.0694** 0.4043** 0.0683** -0.1085 -0.0207 
 [0.1026] [0.0179] [0.1249] [0.0199] [0.2180] [0.0416] 
Sales, Hotels, 
Restaurants -0.1266 -0.0229 -0.1639 -0.0277 -0.0343 -0.0065 
 [0.0846] [0.0154] [0.1057] [0.0180] [0.1491] [0.0285] 
Transportation -0.3724** -0.0674** -0.4605** -0.0778** -0.2033 -0.0388 
 [0.0924] [0.0171] [0.1177] [0.0205] [0.1593] [0.0305] 
Financial Intermediation -0.4038** -0.0731** -0.4760** -0.0805** -0.2901+ -0.0553+ 
 [0.0903] [0.0163] [0.1164] [0.0196] [0.1539] [0.0293] 
Social Services -0.5382** -0.0975** -0.8044** -0.1360** -0.3604* -0.0687* 
 [0.0881] [0.0166] [0.1196] [0.0217] [0.1491] [0.0286] 
Firm Size Small 0.2540** 0.0460** 0.3062** 0.0518** 0.2190* 0.0418* 
 [0.0765] [0.0154] [0.0982] [0.0194] [0.0986] [0.0198] 
Firm Size Medium 0.1438 0.0261 0.2765* 0.0467* 0.0326 0.0062 
 [0.1029] [0.0194] [0.1288] [0.0241] [0.1383] [0.0265] 
Firm Size Large 0.3624** 0.0656** 0.4151** 0.0702** 0.3382** 0.0645** 
 [0.0901] [0.0186] [0.1147] [0.0233] [0.1129] [0.0232] 
Metropolitan Area 
Unemployment Rate -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0009 0.0062 0.0012 
 [0.0079] [0.0014] [0.0106] [0.0018] [0.0118] [0.0022] 
Constant -3.4673** - -3.4839** - -3.7693** - 
 [0.1702] - [0.2268] - [0.2544] - 
 0.4347** - 0.5987** - 0.2424+ - 
 [0.1211] - [0.1670] - [0.1331] - 
Observations 15104  8629  6475  
Log pseudolikelihood  -11384.32  -6346.62  -4952.43  
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Note. Robust standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Table 4. Reduced-form relationship between family characteristics and overeducation 
probability among public employees 
  Total   Men   Women 
  Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect   Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect    Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Average years of 
education other members -0.0169 -0.0036 -0.0385* -0.0075* -0.0057 -0.0013 
[0.0117] [0.0025]  [0.0192] [0.0037]  [0.0155] [0.0035]  
Number of kids age 0 0.2367 0.051 0.226 0.0438 0.3455 0.0773 
[0.1832] [0.0395]  [0.2525] [0.0490]  [0.2823] [0.0631]  
Number of kids age 1 0.0261 0.0056 -0.1384 -0.0268 0.3952 0.0884 
[0.2318] [0.0500]  [0.3191] [0.0617]  [0.3319] [0.0741]  
Number of kids age 2 0.1287 0.0278 0.1939 0.0376 0.0395 0.0088 
[0.2065] [0.0445]  [0.3155] [0.0614]  [0.2791] [0.0625]  
Number of kids age 3 -0.0103 -0.0022 0.1534 0.0297 -0.2101 -0.047 
[0.1643] [0.0354]  [0.2066] [0.0398]  [0.2831] [0.0634]  
Number of kids age 4 0.105 0.0226 0.3126 0.0605 -0.49 -0.1097 
[0.1679] [0.0362]  [0.2156] [0.0415]  [0.3222] [0.0721]  
Number of kids age 5 0.1433 0.0309 0.0563 0.0109 0.2933 0.0656 
[0.1860] [0.0401]  [0.2602] [0.0504]  [0.2904] [0.0649]  
Number of kids age 6 -0.0861 -0.0186 -0.0475 -0.0092 -0.2374 -0.0531 
[0.1948] [0.0420]  [0.2894] [0.0560]  [0.2814] [0.0632]  
Number of kids age 7 -0.0882 -0.019 -0.1797 -0.0348 0.0336 0.0075 
[0.1528] [0.0330]  [0.2163] [0.0418]  [0.2103] [0.0471]  
Number of kids age 8 0.0324 0.007 -0.3145 -0.0609 0.2897 0.0648 
[0.1690] [0.0365]   [0.2365]    [0.0457] [0.2189] [0.0489]  
Wald Test - Joint 
Significance 
2 p-value 2 p-value 2 p-value 
Average years of educ. 2.07 0.1501 4.01 0.0451 0.14 0.7115 
Num. of kids age 0 - 8 3.48 0.9421 6.85 0.6531 9.54 0.3892 
All instruments 5.73 0.8377 11.52 0.3182 9.76 0.4617 
Observations 1823     882     938   
Log pseudolikelihood  -691.89739     -304.19913     -368.02025   
Note. Robust standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Other explanatory variables, except the sector of 
employment, listed in Table 2 are also included in the regression 
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Table 5. Estimates of the sector of employment on over-education with different set of 
instruments 
 
Total Biprobit - IV 
[1] [2] [3] 
Formal job -0.1644** -0.1581** -0.1151** 
[0.0380]  [0.0438]  [0.0434]   
 0.4657** 0.4406** 0.2991* 
  [0.1211] [0.1395] [0.1390] 
Men Biprobit - IV 
[1] [2] [3] 
Formal job -0.2009** -0.2175** -0.1658** 
[0.0468]  [0.0459]  [0.0718]   
 0.6911** 0.7440** 0.5529* 
  [0.1670] [0.1642] [0.2527] 
Women Biprobit - IV 
[1] [2] [3] 
Formal job -0.1071* -0.0616 -0.0749+  
[0.0459]  [0.0444]  [0.0419]   
 0.2473+ 0.109 0.1455 
  [0.1331] [0.1322] [0.1220] 
Instruments       
Average years of education other 
members Yes Yes  
Num. Children 0 - 8 years old Yes   Yes 
Note. Marginal effects are presented. The exogenous variables of individual’s characteristics, job’s characteristics and 
the unemployment rate of the metropolitan listed in Table 3 are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are 
in []. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table A1. Estimates from the bivariate probit model for the job equation (formal=1) 
  Total   Men   Women 
  
 
Coefficient   
 
Coefficient   Coefficient 
Schooling years 0.0720**  0.0597**  0.0889** 
 [0.0051]  [0.0063]  [0.0084] 
Experience 0.0309**  0.0345**  0.0283** 
 [0.0042]  [0.0057]  [0.0065] 
Experience2 -0.0006**  -0.0006**  -0.0006** 
 [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0002] 
Tenure (months) 0.0089**  0.0070**  0.0117** 
 [0.0005]  [0.0007]  [0.0009] 
Tenure2 -0.0000**  -0.0000**  -0.0000** 
 [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
Women 0.1124**  -  - 
 [0.0392]  -  - 
Married 0.1578**  0.1240*  -0.0284 
 [0.0490]  [0.0502]  [0.0448] 
Women Married -0.2146**  -  - 
 [0.0625]  -  - 
Household head 0.0123  0.0002  -0.0674 
 [0.0472]  [0.0475]  [0.0534] 
Women Household head -0.1344*  -  - 
 [0.0668]  -  - 
Industry -0.1677+  -0.1422  -0.1744 
 [0.0895]  [0.1025]  [0.1754] 
Construction -0.4423**  -0.4828**  -0.3387 
 [0.0961]  [0.1072]  [0.2387] 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants -0.0913  -0.0659  -0.0949 
 [0.0893]  [0.1028]  [0.1739] 
Transportation -0.156  -0.1542  -0.1814 
 [0.0965]  [0.1112]  [0.1860] 
Financial Intermediation 0.1458  0.1435  0.1448 
 [0.0964]  [0.1131]  [0.1829] 
Social Services -0.3247**  -0.3393**  -0.3206+ 
 [0.0926]  [0.1132]  [0.1744] 
Firm Size Small 1.0304**  1.0576**  1.0007** 
 [0.0319]  [0.0418]  [0.0499] 
Firm Size Medium 1.4108**  1.4002**  1.4456** 
 [0.0556]  [0.0698]  [0.0925] 
Firm Size Large 1.6865**  1.7470**  1.6118** 
 [0.0331]  [0.0449]  [0.0506] 
Metropolitan Area Unemployment 
Rate -0.0285**  -0.0190*  -0.0413** 
 [0.0069]  [0.0091]  [0.0105] 
Note. Robust standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Table A1. Continued. 
  Total   Men   Women 
  
 
Coefficient   
 
Coefficient   Coefficient
Average years of education other 
members 0.0301**   0.0360**   0.0243** 
 [0.0046]  [0.0060]  [0.0071] 
Number of kids age 0 -0.0916*  -0.1150*  -0.0344 
 [0.0439]  [0.0528]  [0.0771] 
Number of kids age 1 -0.0803+  -0.0920+  -0.0666 
 [0.0432]  [0.0558]  [0.0680] 
Number of kids age 2 -0.0573  -0.0053  -0.1549* 
 [0.0429]  [0.0553]  [0.0692] 
Number of kids age 3 -0.0761+  -0.0594  -0.0871 
 [0.0449]  [0.0562]  [0.0732] 
Number of kids age 4 -0.0886*  -0.0965+  -0.086 
 [0.0441]  [0.0564]  [0.0694] 
Number of kids age 5 -0.0534  -0.0158  -0.0797 
 [0.0453]  [0.0580]  [0.0724] 
Number of kids age 6 -0.0973*  -0.0473  -0.1701* 
 [0.0463]  [0.0587]  [0.0735] 
Number of kids age 7 -0.1567**  -0.1384*  -0.1752** 
 [0.0435]  [0.0579]  [0.0658] 
Number of kids age 8 -0.1525**  -0.0986  -0.2039** 
 [0.0446]  [0.0604]  [0.0671] 
Constant -1.5313**  -1.5984**  -1.3881** 
 [0.1395]  [0.1748]  [0.2426] 
Observations 15104   8629   6475 
Note. Robust standard errors in [].+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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